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INTRODUCTION 
The linkage betv.teen trade and environment is one of the most heated debates in 
international econotnic law. The amount of scholarly"\vtitings is massive/ as \vel] as public 
policies geared toward actual and potential environment and trade clashes. 2 Last but not 
least, trade panels have had the opportunity to address some of the conflicts involved in 
trade and environment disputes, issuing unsatisfactory decisions in the vie-w of 
environmentalists. 
Visiting Professor at the Gradnatc School of La\v (F.ifrria!i:;priio) of the UniYetsidade l"'ederal do Rio 
Grande do Sui (LWRGS) and Ponriffcia Cuivcrsidade Cat6lica de Sio P::mlo (PUC-SP). Ph.D. Candidate 
and LLJVL, University of Texas m Austin (EL1;\) and .Hmkr Prrfi'.r.riowl, University of Paris I (Pmli/o(~!l­
_l'r;rl;rmn/) and lnstitute of P'-1litical Studies of Paris (.\rimrr.r Po) (Franc-e). CAPES Foundation Fellow. 
Profe~~nr of international law at the Federal Uni<:crsity of Rio Grande do Sul - UPRGS (Bra:r.il), Dr. 
Jut, lJnivcrsity of Heidelberg (Germany) and LL.;'d., University of Tiibingcn (Germany). 
For some leading examples, SC'C john H. Jackson, lJ/orld Tmdr R11/n and F"ll!irofi!JJ(IIf!i/ Pf!!irin: Cm(_grtJI'lltt or 
Crmjlirt? 49 \\-'ash. & Lee L. Rev. 1227 (1992); DA:\ITEL C. ES'IY, GREENING THE GAIT: TRADE, 
Ei':VlRO:\lMENT AND TilE FCTCRE (1994); Thomas Schocnbaum, TntrmatiMaf Trade and Prr;trdlrm 
of the Emirf!!lll!cnt: The Cflllfilming Search /fir Rrronri!i,,tirm, 91 Am. J. Tnt'l L. 2(j8 (1997); Robert E. l:-ludcc, 
GATT L-<;gai Rr.rtminf_r M tht Crt rf Tmdr .\Iw.mrcJ rlg,limt Forrig•t Fnrirnnmmtrt! Prarr-ittY, in 2 FAIR TRADE 
AND HARi'viONIZATlON 95 QAGDISH BI-lll.G\\-'ATI & ROBERT HlJDEC: EDS. 1996). for a study 
on the actual role of trade leverage in promoting environmental cooperation in practice, see DUNC,'\:::-J 
BRACK, INTERNATIONAL 'l'RADE AND THE MON'l'REAI" PROTOCOLxvii (1996) (contr:=tdicting 
the conventional \Visdom that environmental trade leverage is either unncce~'ary or ineffective.) 
For a more policy~oricnted appro~ch of the many dehates wi1hin the trade and environment conflict, 
see Gregory Shnffcr, The lf/<wld Trade Or.gani;:;(/titm under Cf,,dfmz,r: Do!!liiTfi'J' trHd the Lmv and Po!itir:.r of the 
!Y"T0} Trmtmmi rj Tmdr rmd Em'it"ij/1!/H!tf _\It~tto:,, 22 Harv. Envtl. L. Rn·. 1 (2001). 
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In analyzing trade and environment disputes, one is usually confronted \.Vith the 
follmv-ing concerns: 3 Is economic integration through trade a threat to the environment? 
Does trade undermine the regulatory efforts of governments to control pollution and 
resource degradation? \\/ill economic growth driven by trade help us to move tm.vards a 
sustainable use of the \vorld's environmental resources? 
This article examines the trade and environment debate in the context of a very recent 
dispute that has arisen with respect to a Brazilian ban on the import of retread tin:s. Recently 
Brazil banned imports of retread tires and Urut,Tttay challenged the consistency of the Brazilian 
measures in face of MERCOSUR la~: A panel, constituted to decide the dispute, concluded 
the Brazilian measures '\vere inconsistent v.,j_th LviERCOSURlawand ordered Brazil to eliminate 
the ban ·within IvfERCOSUR countries. 
Immediately after the MERCOSUR decision \vas rendered, the EU, a major retread 
tire exporter, challenged the Brazilian measures as inconsistent \Vith the 1994 General 
Agreement of Tariffs and Trade (GATT). After unsuccessful diplomatic negotiations bet\veen 
Brazil and the EU, the dispute was submitted to the Dispute Settlement Body (DSB) of the 
\Xlorld Trade Organization (\VTO) for consultation. In January 2006, a \\/TO arbitration 
panel was established to decide the dispute. 
In 2005, again at the request of Uruguay, another 1IERCOSUR panel has been 
constituted to examine Argentinean measures, concerning practices maintained by Argentina 
affecting trade in retread tires. Surprisingly, the Panel found that the Argentinean measures 
'\Verc in accordance with 1.fERCOSUR la\v; given that they aim at protecting the environment 
and public health. However, for the first time in i\1ERCOSlJR history, the Appellate Body 
exercised its jurisdiction, in response to Uruguay's appeal, and revoked the panel's decision. 
PART I of this article \vill address the most relevant trade and environment scholarship 
and the development of selected trade and environment/ public health jurisprudence in the 
GATI/WTO. 
PART II \\Ti.ll deal with the ~fERCOSUR dispute over trade in retread tires, explaining 
the specific products banned by Brazil, the relevant treaty' provisions under which the import 
ban was reviewed by the IviERCOSUR arbitration panel, and the consequent regulatory 
changes produced in domestic lav.: 
PART III will address \Xl'f() dispute over trade in retread tires, setting out the specific 
provisions of the \Xi'TO agreements that the European Communities (EC) contend are 
currently being violated by the Brazilian ban, along with a description of the '\vay in which 
these provisions have been interpreted by previous decisions of the \XlTO panels and 
Appellate Body. Finally, Part TV' concludes the article. 
See HAKAN NORDSTR01-1 & SCOTT Vr'\L'GHAJ.'\J, WTO SECRETARIAT SPECIAL STUDIES NO. 
4 TRADE A:\"D ENVIRO~~fENT 1-7 (1999).ApudJACKSO::\:,jOH.0< H. ET AT,.,LEG,\LPROBIE\15 
OF INTERNATIONAL ECONO~UC REf .:\TIO;...;S: CASES, ~i.A Ti·:RlALS AND TEXT lOOtl (2002). 
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PART I. 
REVIEW OF TRADE AND ENVIRONMENT LITERATURE AND 
JURISPRUDENCE 
Professors Edith Brown \\lciss and John H. Jackson lay out the main types of 
clashes involved in environment and trade disputes: 4 (1) national measures to protect the 
domestic environment, (2) unilateral national measures to protect the environment outside 
national jurisdiction, (3) international (multilateral) em-ironmental agreements and the WTO, 
and (4) the product/ process distinction. 
1. NATIONAL MEASURES TO PROTECT THE DOMESTIC ENVIRONMENT 
Under this category of trade and environment conflict, States adopt environmental 
laws or regula1·ions and foreign parties challenge these measures in face of their inconsistency 
with the text of GATT 19994 or the At:,JTccments on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) and 
on the Application of Sanitary and Phytosanltary Nfeasures (SPS). The rationale for such 
types of measures normally is that "the product is restricted for sale domestically, and 
imports should not be able to threaten human health and the environment in ways that the 
same domestic products cannot."5 
See EDITH BR0\\71\" \'\lEISS &JOHN I-I JACKSOt\i, RECONCILI~G ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE 
27-28 (2001). For a somewhat different conceptmdi7ation of the environment and trade conflict, see 
Joost Pauwelyn, Rum! Books 011 Tmde and hm-irMmmt: GATT PhmfM11.r Still Haunt the WTO, European 
Journal of lncernational Law (2004), Vol.15 No.3, 575. P:lU\\Tlyn diYidc·s the tension bet\veen trade and 
enYiromnent in the following manner: "First, treaties liberalizing trade can harm the environment. In 
this sense, trade and environment may conHict in at lcasr four ways: 
(I) more trade anJ economic activity may result in more environmental degradation; 
(Il) tbe competition brought about by free trade may put pressure on governments to lowe1 
environmental standards (the so called 'race to the bottom'); 
(III) trade agreements may prevent govetnmenrs from enacting certain environmental ret,>"CUations; and 
(I\~ trade law may prohibit the usc of trade sanctions or preferences, be it as sticks or carrots to ensure 
the signing up to, or compliance with (international) environmental standards. 
Second, trade restrictions or distortions can hann the envi.ronmenL ln this sense, track liber;1liz:uion 
and enYironm~·ntal protection go hand in hancl in at least three ways: 
(I) trade liberali:tation should lead to higher levels of development and make available resources for 
environmental protection (the Environmental Kuznets Curve); 
(Il) trade-distorting sub~idics and other support for over-production (activities generally disliked by 
trade Ja,v), be it in the fisheries or agricultural sectors, can deplete environmental resources; and 
(lTI) trade re~trictions on the provision of cross"border services or technology to recycle or otherwise 
limit environmcnt:'!l harm can delay or prevent the efficient protection of the environmem." Id. 
at 578. 
ld. at 28. 
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This category of conflict has been brought to the attention of GA TI and WTO 
dispute settlement mechanisms in three prominent disputes: the Thai Cigarette Case,6 the 
Reformulated Gasollne Case,7 and the Beef Hormones Casc.8 
In the Thai Cigaretrc Case (a pre \'{iTO case), the main issue under consideration was 
whether or not the Thai restrictions on the import of tobacco and tobacco products ·were 
legitimate measures to protect public health. 
The US argued that the restrictions on imports of cigarettes by Thailand were 
inconsistent with Article XI of the GAT'f 1947, -.,:~:hich proYidcs [or the general dimination 
of quantitative restrictions. In addition, the compbining party alleged that the Thai measures 
w·crc not justified by the exceptions contained in Article Xl:2(c), which exetnpts certain 
agricultural products from the prohibi6on on the use of quantitati-ve restrictions, or under 
Article :x:.-X(b ), ·which allo"\YS d1e use of measures necessary to protect human health. Lastly, 
the US argued that Thailand's Protocol of Accession did not cover the Thai measures, and 
that Thailand's excise tax, and its business and municipal taxes on cigarettes were inconsistent 
with GATT Articles III:1 and III:2, "\Vhicb require national treatment of internal taxation.~ 
The Panel held that the Thai measures "\Vtn; a quantitative restriction on the 
importation of cigarettes inconsistent with Article XI:1 and not justified under Article 
Xl:2(c), Article XX~)), or Thailand's Protocol of Accession. 
In the Reformulated Gasoline Case, 10 the US Em,ironmemal Protection Agency 
issued a regulation distinguishing ben.vcen t\vo types of baselines to assess gasoline quality: 
individual baselines, "\vhich represent the quality of gasoline produced by a specific refiner, 
and statutory basefu1e that reflects average US 1990 gasoline quality. 
The Regulation did not provide for the possibility of using individual baselines for 
other domestic or foreign refiners. In some cases, the individual baselines \Vere more 
advantageous than the statutory baseline. 
(, Thailand ~ Restrictions on Imponation of lmernal Taxes on Cigarettes. Adopted on 7 November 
1990, GATr B.1.S.D. (37'0 Supp.) at 200 (1991). 
l!nited States , .. ScaHJarJs for Reformulated and Conventional Cfasoline: Repor1 of the Appellate 
Body, \"\'lT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29, 1996). 
Repon of the Appdlate Body, EC )It:asurc~ Cunceming l>·kat and Meat Product~ (Hormonc~), \VT/ 
DS26/AB/R and \I/T/DS48/ AB/R AB-1997-4 (16 Jan. 1998). 
"The 'national treatment' d::tuse in rnllle agrec:mcnts ·was designed ro cnsure that intt:nMI flscal or 
administrative regulatiutb would nor introduce discrimination of a nontariff nature. it forbids 
discriminatory usc of r.he follu\ving: taxes or other internal kvit:8; b.ws, rcgulatiuns, and dccrees 
affecting the sale, offer for sale, purchast", transport, disuibutiun, ... " Encyclopaedia Britannica, 
cil'c.!l'!ubit' at http://'»iW\\·,brit:tnnica.com/dJ/articlc-61721 (last visited Jan. 16, 2005). 
10 Jee Patricia Isda Hansen, Tl<.tfloj0ah!h), Jt,uhLmls of RniUJ, and tbe Use of I'hlf!t :\Ieu.mns to Prokd ilk C!ubd 
L'.!ll'irunmut! [hereinafrcr 11<1!1.Jj\m.'lt0], 39 VA. J I~T'L L 1017, 1048 (1999). 
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Venezuela and Brazil brought a claim to the \X/TO, alleging that the US regulation 
\'lola ted Articles 1:1 (General Most-Favored-Nation Treatment),n III:1 and III:4 (National 
Treatment on Internal Taxation and Regulation), Articles 2.1 and 2.2 of the Agreement on 
Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), relating to the preparation, adoption and application of 
technical regulations, and nul_lification and impairment of benefits. 
The Panel held that the Gasoline Regulations \Vere inconsistent \Vith Article III:4 of 
the GATf, \vhich requires that imported like products must be treated no less favorably 
than like domestic products with respect to lmvs and regulations. ~'Iorcoyer, the Panel 
concluded the liS measures \vere not justified under the exception of Article XX(g) of 
GATT 1994, as a measures relating to the conserYation of exhaustible natural resources. 
The .. \ppellate Body reversed the Panel's findings that the measures did not fall 
"\Vithin the scnpe of ArticlcXX(g). In the Appellate Body's opinion, the measures fall under 
the exception of Article XX(gJ, but failed to meet the nx1u.irements of the Cihpemt of _Article 
XX. The Chopco;t of Article XX pro\---ides that a measure may not be applied in a manner that 
"\vould constitute a means of arbitrary or unjt1stifiable discrimination between countries 
where the same conditions prevail, or a dist:,:rtlised restriction on international trade. 
In the Beef Hormones Case, the European Communities (EC) adopted the Counri/ 
Dircc!itic ProhibitinJ!, the UJe in]_.ilwJtork _htrming ?f Certain SuhJ!ances _t-fm_,fng a Hormr;nal At:tion. 
Most-Pavor-:--Jation Clause (1IFC'.J): "provision in a commercial treaty binding the signatories to extend 
trading benefits c<lual to those accorded any third stale. The clause ensures equal commercial 
opportunities, especially concerning imporr duties and freedom of investment. Generally reciprocal, 
in the late 19th and early 20th cent. unilateral ]'v1F::--.J clauses ,_-wre imposed on Asian nations by the 
more powerful \Vestcrn countries (see Open Door). Jn the late 20t.h cent. tariff and trade agreements 
were negoriared simultaneously by all interested parties through the General Agreement on Tariffs 
and Trade (GATI), which ultimately resulted in the \'('orld Trade Organi;-:ation. Such a wide exchange 
of concessions is intended to promote free trade, alLhough there has been criticism of the principle 
of equal trading opporrunitics on the grounds that freer rrade benefits the economically strongest 
countries. GATT members recognized in principle that· the ::VfF:t"< rule should be relaxed to 
accommodarc the needs of developing countries, and the UN Conference on Trade and Dn-eloprncnt 
(est. 1964) has sought to extend preferential treatmenr to the exports of the dcYcloping countries. 
Annther ch~llenge to the ~-lfN principle has been posed by regional Lrading groups such as the 
Europ,'an Union, which havt: lowered or elimimued tariffs among the members while maintaining 
tariff '\.valls between member nations and the rest of the ,,_-0rld. Jn the 1990s continued MFN qaru~ for 
China sparked US. controversy because of it5 sales of sensitive milit:uy tC"cllnology and irs usc of 
prison labor, and its .MFN status was only made permanent in 2000. All of the former Soviet states, 
including Russia, were granted MF-:\l status in 1992." See The Columbia Encyclopedia, Sixth 
Edition. 2001-05. The general scope of the J\.1FN obligation \VaS discussed by the i\ppellate Body in 
EUROPEAN C0?>1.:\1l)l\!JTIES- REGii'viE FOR TilE UvfPORTATION, SALE ;\ND DISTRIBUTION 
OF TIAN;\l:'-:AS, W'T/DS27/i\.B/R, adopted by the DSB on September 25, 1997. 
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The US challenged the European measure based on the San..itary and Phytosanitary 
Agreement. The Agreement permits countries to take food and safety measures, provided 
several conditions are met, such as: SPS measure be based on sufficient scientific evidence 
(Article 2.2), and risk assessment (Article 5.1). \Xlh.ile the SPS Agreement encourages 
harmonization ofSPS measures (Article 3.1), it allows the maintenance of measures resulting 
in a higher level of protection than would be achieved by international standards (Article 3.3). 
To the US and Canada, the EC measures, by restricting or prohibiting the importation 
of meat and meat products from the US, violated Article III (requiring national treatment) 
and XI GA 1T (prohibiting quantitative restrictions), Articles 2, 3 and 5 of the SPS Agreement, 
Article 2 of the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (on the preparation, adoption and 
application of technical regulations), and Article 4 of the Agreement on Agriculture (on 
market access commitments). 
Tbe Panel only examined the claims brought under the SPS Agreement and held the 
EC measures to be inconsistent with Articles 3.1, 5.1 and 5.5 of the Agreement. The Appellate 
Body confirmed the Panel's fu1cling that the EC import ban was inconsistent with Article 5.1 
(requiring risk assessment). 
2. UNILATERAL NATIONAL MEASURES TO PROTECT THE ENVIRONMENT 
OuTSIDE NATIONAL JurusDICTION 12 
According to \Veiss and Jackson, 13 the main characteristic of this type of measures is 
that it is unilaterat in that sense that they are not taken pursuant to implementing an 
international or multilateral agreement. Reasons such as a country not wanting to watch 
helplessly as a species identified as endangered by an international agreement forced into 
extinction by fishing methods that destroy the animals as by-catch may warrant a clash 
ben:veen environment and trade interests. 14 
Principle 12 of the 1992 Rio Declaration on Environment and Development 
addressed the issue of unilateral national measures aimed at protecting the environment 
outside national jurisdiction. 15 
12 See gwcru!/} Hansen, 'IlimJpurtm)', mj)m not.e 10 (arguing that environment and trade disputes may be 
reduced if governments adopt more transparent decisionmaking procedures.) See aho Richard 'V./. 
Parker, The UJI~ and Abttse ~f Trade Lactugt to Pro!ed tile Ckba! Com mom: fVhat Can !-f?(; Leam_from The Tuna-
D"lj;hitt CuHjlid, 12 CEO. INT'L ENVIL. L. REV. 1 (1999) (concluding there are more pro than cons in 
the use of environmental trade leverage.) 
1
·
1 See BRO\\iN \VEISS & JACKSON, -'"Pm nme 4, at 29. 
1-1 Id 
15 Principle 12: "Unilateral actions to deal wirh environmental challenges outside the jurisdiction of 
the importing country should be avoided. Environmental measures addressing Transboundary or 
global environmental problems should, as fat as possibie, be based on an intenrJ.tion·,tl consensus." 
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This type of environment and trade contlict has been tested .in the Tuna-Dolphin 
I,1(, Tuna Dolphin-Il,17 and Shrimp-Turtle Cases.18 
Tuna-Dolphin I and II Cases addressed the consistency of U.S. measures to protect 
the Eastern Spinner Dolphin from fishing by purse seine nets, concluding that the measures 
"\Vcre inconsistent with the GATT. The Panel in Tim a-Dolphin I rejected the US arguments for 
extraterritorial application of the Article XX (b) and (g) exceptions,19 but the Panel in Tuna-
Dolphin II allowed for the possibility of extraterritorial application of.Articlc _X_L'{ (g).20 
In the Shrimp-Turtle Casc,21 the \XlTO Appellate Body concluded that a e.S. 
prohibition on shrimp hanrested by methods that arc harmful to sea turtles was unjustifiable 
and arbitrary, regardless of the fact that the U.S. banned the use of such methods by its o-wn 
tuna fleet, and that the sea turtles species protected by the prohibition were recognized to be 
in danger of extinction. The Appellate Body revisited the conflict in 2001.22 
3. INTERNATIONAL (MULTILATERAL) EN>'IRONMENTAL AGREEMENTS 
ANDTHEWTO 
Because the environment overlaps states territorial divisions, countries are forced to 
enter into international agreements to protect shared environrnental resources.23 Such 
agreements may include the prohibition of imports and exports of products if the importing 
and exporting countries are not parties to the agreement or are not complying ·with it.14 
From a strategic perspective, these agreements should include obligations that 
encourage the participation of as many countries as possible, avoiding that nonmembers 
States become "havens" that jeopardize the effectiveness of the agreement (the free rider 
problem).25 
l{, United States Restrictions on Imports uf Tuna, Aug. 16, 1l.J91, GATT B.l.S.D. (Y.l'11 Supp.) at 155 (1993) 
(unadopted Panel Report), reprinted in 30 I..L.!:vl. 1594 (1991). 
17 Un.itt"d States Restrictions on Imports of Tuna, June 1994, P 5.5, reprinted in 33 I.L..:\-f. 839. 
IS United Stares Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and Shrimp Products: Report of rhe Appellate 
Body, \'<7T/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998). 
19 Patricia lsela Hansen, The Tmjlart of the WTO and NAFTA 011 U.\. Lmt', 46 J. OF 1 J:::GAL EDUC., 569, 576 
(1996). 
20 See Hansen, Trmr')''1Tfii(J, .rupm note 10, at 1027 and 1031. 
21 ld. at 1053. 
22 Sec Howard F. Chang, Em'irrmmmtrr/ Trade Jftrrrlltn, T!Je .Sb11ill;"'l·Tmtle RulingJ~ and T/;e Orr!i11a~y Jiram!rg of 
the Text of the GAT!~ 8 Chap. L. ReY. 25 (2005) (arguing that the 2001 ruling by the Appellate Body 
confirms and interpretation of the 1998 shrimp-turtle decision that prcscr>:es broad ke\vay for the 
use of enYironmenml trade measures.) 
23 See BRO\\'N \\fElSS & JACKSON, sH_l!ra note 4, at 30. 
24 Id 
2
' Id, at 3\}~31. 
84 
'Ibe Montreal Protocol on Substances that Deplete the Ozone Lay,er, the Convention 
on International Trade in Endangered Species (CITES), the Basel Convention on the 
Trans boundary -,\:fovemcm of Hazardous \"Xlaste, and the Cartagena Protocol on Biosafcty 
arc jjlustrativc examples of multilateral environmental agreements that restrict trade in 
controlicd items. 
For international trade law, the issue is '\vbether these agreements violate Article I 
(Most Favored Nation Treatment), III (National Treatment) and XI (Prohibition of 
Quantitative Restrictions) of CATT 1994, and if so, \vhethcr Article XX exceptions apply to 
make them nonetheless GATf consistent."26 
4. THE PRODUCT /PROCESS DISTINCTION 
CAITTrcary focuses on products, whereas the production process is gcncraUy acceprcd 
as falling outside the reach of the non-discriminatory principles of national treatment and 
most-favored-nation. However, under an enYironmental perspective, "[pjroclucts that arc 
produced by processes that pollute the air, water or land, or that destroy living natural 
resources and their habitats may be far more destructive of sustainable development than 
the products themselves."27 
However, more recent trade and environment disputes, such as the Tuna-Dolphin 1 
and II Cases and the Shrimp-Turtle Case, point that this distinction is highly disputable, 
noting that processes can both endanger the environment and distort trade. Trade distortion 
happens if certain countries are allO\ved to work under lax environmental standards in the 
making of products that compete with those of countries complying with rigid 
environmental laws and regulations (in a sort of subsidy). 
But if these concerns arc worthy of the trade community's attention, the merit of 
the product/ process distinction is attributable tO the fact that GATT closes the door to 
using a variety of regulatory differences to pose barriers to trade, undermining the goal of 
trade liberalization.28 
The issue here, as correcdy recall Brm.vn \V'eiss & Jackson, is ''how to develop criteria 
by which to judge whether trade baniers based on processes are an appropriate accommodation 
of the competing trade and env-ironment policies, or whether on the contrary the barriers are 
really protectionist measures in the guise of environmental (or other process) conside-
rations."29 
26 ld. at 32 
"IJ. 
28 Id. at 33. 
29 See BRO\Xl~ \\lElSS & JACKSON, supra note LX, at 33. 
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The retread tire dispute falls mostly under the category of national measures to 
protect the domestic environment, 'Whereas the central issue before the dispute settlement 
bodies is whether the import ban on retread tires arc grounded on genuine environmental 
interests that could trump commercial commitments assumed by the involved countries 
regionally and multilaterally. 
PART II. 
THE MERCOSUR DISPUTES OVER TRADE IN RETREAD TIRES30 
A. THE BRAZILIAN LITIGATION 
On September 17, 2001, a l\1ERCOSUR panel \Vas formed, pursuant the Brasilia 
Protocol, to decide a dispute presented by Uruguay against Brazil, concerning trade practices 
maintained by Brazil affecting trade in retreated tires.ln this case, the parties and the panel 
overlooked the linkage between trade and environment. The legal issue before the panel \vas 
whether the Brazilian import ban on retread tires was consistent with MERCOSUR law. 
"Cruguay claims that Portari"J no 8 of September 25,2000 of the Bra:tilian Secretariat 
of Foreign Trade (SE(]<:X), \.Vhich imposes an import ban on used and retreated tires 
(classified under codes 4012.20 and 4012.10 of the Combined Nomenclature, respectively), 
violates i\fERCOSUR la\\~ more precisely: Decision n° 22/00 of June 29 2000 of the Common 
Market Council (that prohibits the adoption of measures, of any nature, restrictive of 
reciprocal trade),I\rticle 1 of the Asuncion Treaty (that establishes the objective of consolidating 
the process of integration and economic cooperation) and ~A.rticles 1 and 1 0(2) of Annex 1 
to the Asuncion Treaty (that bans all non·· tariff restrictions), and general principles of 
intematjonallaw (Estoppel). 
Brazil, on the other hand, denies Uruguay's allegations that Portaria N° 8/00 is 
incompatible ·with :tvfERCOSUR law. 
\XIith regard to Portaria No 08/00, Bra:til states this Portar.ia regulates the importation 
of used items. To Bra:til, retreated tires are used goods, regardless of the fact they have been 
subject to any sort of industrial process aiming at augmenting its longevity. In this sense, 
Brazil states that MERC:OSUR Committee of Technical Rules, in 2000, issued Technical 
3
'} .See jf,i'l!l'ml/} I'abio 0-Jorosini, 0 Ca.ro do.r Pnrtmuilicrrr: Pnji:r!nria.i Rcgir;nm".r e Qrtr.r!iir.i Amhimt<~i.i [The Tire Ctm: 
Rl'gional I'rrf·n,Jrc.r and EnJ"irtinmcl!ir!l l.r.rtte.r], PONTES: ENTRE 0 COI\1[-?,RCTO E 0 DESE:NVOL-
VLYIEJ"\"TO SlJS'l'E~NTA VEL 12 (October-December. 2005), available ar wl.vw.ictsd.org/monthly I 
pontes. 
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Norms no 224:2000 and 225:2000, which according to the Brazilian government, define a 
retreated tyre as a used good that undenvent a process of reutilization of an existing good.31 
In addition, Brazil states that Argentina also bans the importation of retreated tires, based 
on the findings that retreated tires arc used tires, to which importation is prohibited based 
on the context of 1\1ERCOSUR's automotive policy.32For these reasons, Brazil challenges 
Uruguay's argument that Bra;.dl docs not consider retreated tires used goods and argues that 
retreated tires faJl under the authority ofPortaria no 8/91, which regulates the importation 
of used goodsY 
By adoptjng Portaria n° 8/00, Brazil states that it "\Vas trying to reprimand the 
importation of retreated tires that \Vas taking place due to gaps in the information system 
for foreign trade, the SISCOJ\IEX.34 In this sense, Portaria n° 8/00, in regulating the 
importation of retreated tires, performs an interpretative function to previous regulations.y; 
By no means it establishes a ne\v prohibition to include a ban on the importation of 
retreated tires.36 Thus, Portaria n° 8/00 does not violate Decision no 22/00 because the 
former merely clarifies the importation system of used goods in Brazil.3-
The Panel's Interpretation and Application of 1IERCOSUR Law 
Portaria tl 0 8/00 
Uruguay sustains that Brazilian lmn ami n:Jj,ttldtionJ concerning trade in retreated tires 
and related mJJJJJJtnial practitfJ' in Brazil support the conclusion that Brazil did consider used 
and retreated tires as rum different goods, subject to distinct legal treatment. 
First, as for the body ofla\v emanated from different Brazilian authorities during the 
almost ten-year period that divided one Portaria from another, the Tribunal rejects the 
argument presented by Brazil, sustaining that it could not be representative of Brazil's 
official legal understanding on the issue. 38 Brazil advocated that the laws and regulations 
presented by Uruguay as evidence of a differentiated legal treatment conferred to retreated 
and used tires are from different sectors of the Brazilian public administration that docs not 
have the authority to regulate foreit,rn commerce in Brazil. 39 ln response to this claim, the 
Yu Arbitral Award VI~- Tyres- from Uruguay to Brazil-· 01/09/2002, ar. 11, dtailablc at 




Js Jd. at 9. 
36 Id. at 9. 
37 
.See i\rbiual Award VI- Tyres frorn Uruguay to Brazil -- 01/09/2002, at 10, <ttai!abli at 
www.MERCOSUR.org.uy Qast visireJ May 9, 2005). 
]~ [d. ilt 20. 
39 Id 
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Tribunal concludes that as matter of internationallmv, Article 4 of the Project about State 
Responsibility, of November 2001, of the International Law Comrnission,40 "the behavior 
of any state institution will be considered as an act of state, regardless of the legislative, 
executive or judiciary function of this institution."41 Consequently, the Tribunal concludes 
that all the separate pieces of regulations and legislation issued by different instjtutions of 
the Brazilian government is representative of this country's legal understandi11g on the issue 
disputed in the present controversy.42 
Second, as for the internal commercial practice performed by Brazil in that same 
time frame, the panel takes into account the evidence presented by Uruguay, indicating that 
the import authorization of retreated tires from Uruguay amounted to a continuous and 
growing trade between that country and Brazil. In the Tribunal's view, this ongoing trade 
was warranted by the behavior of different institutions of the Brazilian public 
administration.-n 
In conclusion, the panel agrees with Uruguay that the import ban imposed on used 
tires by Portaria n° 8/91 was never intended to extend to retreated tires,44 given the internal 
practice of Brazil in accepting the importation of Uruguayan retreated tires during a period 
of almost ten years that divided Porta ria n° 8/91 from Portaria n° 8/00,indicating that the 
Brazilian public administration never considered retreated tires as used tires.45 
Re_ro/ution 109/94 if the Common Aiarket Group 
Brazil sustains that Resolution 109/94, of February 15, 1994, of the Common 
Market Group subjects the legal treatment of used goods to the national legislation of the 
member states, including the definition of used goods. 4(> 
The panel emphasizes that Resolution 109/94 est_ablishes an exception to the Treaty 
of Asuncion and thet·efore should be interpreted restrictivelyY In addition, Uruguay argues 
that Resolution 109/94 does not support arbitrary changes in the legal systems of the 
member states, which affects trade inside lvfERCOSUR.48 In that regard, the panel concludes 
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6 !d. at 21. 
- Set Arbit-ral A\,·ard VI - Tyres from Uruguay to Brazil- 01/09/2002, ar 21, rwai!aMe at 
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legislative harmonization process in i\'fERCOSUR, Portaria n" 8/00 would not be justified 
under such exception because it contradicts establlshcd commercial practice in the region, i.e., 
the constant and growing trade flow of retreated tires. 49 
DniJion 22/00 if the Common Market Cotmtil 
Decision 22/00 of June 29,2000, of the Common IVlarket Council states that "[t]hc 
"1\'fember States shall not adopt any measure restrictive to reciprocal trade, regardless of rhc 
nature of the measure, but shall take into account the reservation established in Article 2(b_) 
of Annex 1 to the Asuncion Treaty." 
Portaria n° 8/00 is later in rime to Decision 22/00 of the Common _l'vfarket Council and 
establishes a restriction to reciprocal trade. 5° Thus, the Tribunal concludes Portaria no 8/00 
violates Decision 22/00 of the Common Market Council. 51 The panel reasons that, \vhereas 
Decision n° 22/00 does not modify the applJcability of Resolution n° 109/94 generally, it 
conditions the capacity of the member states to modify, from the date of the Decision's 
approval, the rench of their national regulations and legislation concerning the imposition 
of ne\v restrictions to trade of used goods. 52 
Central PtimijJkJ ~l Lnr: E.rtoppel 
Uruguay argues that Portaria n" 8/00 contradicts: 53 (a) the extensive commercial 
practice in Brazil, al.lowing the importation of retreated tires from Uruguay or third countries, 
and (b) the interpretation and application of the existing body of la-..v related to the subject 
matter. On these grounds, Uruguay sustains the confrontation of Portaria n" 8/00 with 
these t\vo factual circumstances gives rise to a claim under the principle of"renire tOJJ!ra.fadJt/!1 
proprium" or the principle of estoppel. 54 
Brazil, on the other hand, argues the principle of estoppel is not applicable to the 
disputed facts, because the alleged Brazilian commercial practices related to the importation 
of retreated tires were not constant and certain as to create legitimate expectations on third 
countries.53 
~4 ld 
00 I d. at 22. 
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52 See Arbitral A\vard VI- Tyres- from Uruguay w Brazil 01/09/2002, at 22, i.l!"<~i!dl;/t at 
www.MERCOSUR.org.uy (last visited May 9, 2005). 
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The panel concludes that the con6nuous commercial trade in retreated tires bct\.vcen 
Brazil and Uruguay, and official declarations of Brazilian authorities regulating directly or 
indirectly the importation of used and retreated tires could create a legitimate expectation in 
Uruf.:,JUay that, in confrontation "\Vith Portar.ia D0 8/00, coutd qualify as a situation described 
in the principle of "rmire rontm.JOdttm }mj)Ji!IJN. " 56 However, the panel preferred to take a 
different road, and stated that given the involved countries are members of an ongoing 
integration process promoted under the auspices of MERCOSUR, the decision~making 
body shall rely on principles of mutual trust, which bars the" renin; ronhn farttml proprirm;."5-: 
FinaUy, the panel rejects the alJegations of the Brazilian government that deny the 
extensive trade flow in retreated tires recobmized by official acwrs of the public administration 
of BraziL38 
On January 8, 2002, the panel decided that Portaria n" 8/00 is not compatible "\\r:ith 
:lVfERCOSUR la\\r and ordered that Brazil adapt its laws to conform the Tribunal's legal 
findings. From the panel's findings that the referred trade practices maintained by Brazil 
affecting trade in retreated tires are in violation of TVIERCOSUR law, it resulted that: 
1. Brazil eliminated the ban for retreated tires imported from other lviERCOSUR 
countries by means ofPortaria SECEX 11° 2 ofJVIarch 8, 2002; 
2. Presidential Decree n° 4 592 of February 11, 2003 exempted retreated rires imported 
from other i\TERCOSDR countries from the financial penalties established under 
Presidential Decree no 3919 of September 14, 2001; 
3. Article 55, paragraph 1 ofPortaria SECEX n° 17 of December 1, 2003 replaced 
and revoked Portaria 8/00. Article 39 of the ne\v Portaria restated that import 
licences shall not be issued for used and retreated tires, \Vith the exception of 
retreads originating in other lviERCOSUR countries. 
In face of the parties' "forgetfulness" of the link bet\veen the challenged trade 
measures and the protection of the environment and public health, it is \VOtth asking 
"\vhether the panel, according to ;\fERCOSDR law, could have raised this issue ex officio. t\s 
far as \X/TO law goes, the answer to this question is NO. JvfERCOSCRhas not yet t3.ced this 
question, but it could be argued that, as a matter of public policy (ordre jmbli1), the panel 
could raise the issue of environmental protection, even though the parties did not do so.-~<J 
56 Id 
Set Arbitral Aw:ud V! - Tyres- from Cruguay to Brazil 01/09/2002, H 24, rllirlil(lh/e at 
\\'\1'\v.l\fERCOSUR.org.uy (last visited .i'v!ay 9, 2005). 
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09 Preamble to the t\smKion Treaty (esrab!ishing that rhe economic integration process amongsr the 
member States of ~1ERCOSUR shall take into accounl rhc preservation of the environment). 
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Moreover, had Brazil recotc,rnizcd the links of the present dispute with environmental 
protection issues, it could have invoked Article 50 of the Montevideo Treaty, which allows 
for the adoption of measures that, if not for environmental reasons, would be contrary to 
the efforts of trade liberalization within the member States of the I .atinAmericanAssociation 
of Integration La\v (ALADJ). Article 50 of the J\.iontevideo Treaty has been incorporated 
into 1fERCOSUR la\.v by means of Article 2(b) of Annex I to the Asuncion Treaty, which 
states that trade restrictions can be defined as any measure that is administrative, financial, or 
pertains to currency exchange, under \vhich a State bans or makes it difficult, by unilateral 
decision, reciprocal trade; and establishes that measures adopted under the circumstances 
prescribed in Article 50 of the lvlontevideo Treaty shall not constitute a trade restriction. 
Soon after the .MERCOSUR panel issued its decision, the media in Brazil devoted 
close attention to the negative environmental impacts of the panel's findings. The main 
newspapers in Brazil published articles with headings such as "Bra;d/ lvfq)' Betome Garbage 
DepoJitfor World Tire.s''. 60 
THE IMPACT oF MERCOSUR ON BRAZILIAN LAw? 
The Federal Pub lie Attorney's Office, in a class action, challenged Presidential Decree 
no 4592 of February 11,2003, which e._xempted retread tires imported from other I-.1ERCOSUR 
countries from the financial penalties established under Presidential Decree n° 3919 of 
September 14, 2001." 
The class action brings up environmental arguments not yet raised by Brazil in the 
MERCOSLJR litigation. The Federal Public Attorney's Office argues that the Brazilian ban 
on retread tires is based on environmental t:,>-rounds. In other words, the ban is justified by 
the adverse effects liberalizing trade in retread tires in Brazil has on the environment itself 
and on public health. The precautionary principle, which allows for the adoption of certain 
measures to protect the environment even though the risks are not yet scientifically proved, 
\vas one of the main arguments raised in this class action to justify upholding the ban. In 
addition, the Federal Public Attorney's Office referred to Article 50 of the lvlontevideo Treaty, 
'\vhich permits the adoption of measures, aimed at protecting the environment, which 
would othenvise constitute trade restrictions. The class action concludes by requesting that 
the Brazilian measure which subjects the importation as well as the marketing, transportation, 
storage, keeping or keeping in deposit of retreated imported tires to a fine ofR$ 400 per unit 
be upheld, without exceptions! 
00 Silvio Bressan, Brasil Po de Virar '']_jxtJo" c\IIf!tdi<~l de Pneus: Com 100 jJi!hiKJ de Ctn-araJ~. Pais Corrc o His-co de 
Rntber Sobras da Etimpa f/ja M"nrJJtu; Jornal 0 Estado de Siio Paulo, 03.17.2003. 
61 See A<;iio Civil PUbhca I:vf.inisttrio Ptiblico Federal contra Uniiio Federal, Joinvilk, Santa Catarina State, 
06.02.2003 (on file with author). 
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From an economic integration policy perspective, it is interesting to note that nowhere 
in the class action, has the l~deral Public Attorney's Office directly questioned the constitutional 
validity of the 1viERCOSUR Report. As pointed out by Celso Amorin, ·~{inister of External 
Relations, "for a country that aspires to be the ~1ERCOSUR leader, questioning the Arbitral 
Award would be like 'a shot on ones own foot', because later Brazil would lose its legitimacy 
in other disputes of its interest."('2 However, at least one Brazilian international law scholar, 
Cliudia Lima 1v1arques, has argued for the unconstitutionality of the panel Report and lts 
illegality pursuant existing public internationaJ law.0 
In Professor Lima Marques' view, the l\JERCOSOR decision violates the following 
articles to the Braf:iban Constitution: Article 1 (sovereignty and human dignity), Artkle 4 
(reception of the lviontevidco Treaty), Article 49 (delegated competency for Treaties), Article 
84 Qirnltcd competency for international re11.tions), Article 92 Qudicial control), Article 109 
(supremacy of the fundamental rights conferred by the Constitution in face of Treaties), 
Article 170 (principles governing the national economy), and i\rticle 225 (fundamental right 
of protection of the environment by the State). 64 
As to the supposed illegality of the MERCOSUR decision in the light of governing 
principles of public international law, Professor Lima :Marques' argues the 1991 Asuncion 
TreatyT, whjch institutionally creates MERCOSUR, is a consequence of the broader 1980 
lviontevideo Treaty, which creates the Latin American Association of Integration Lav:,: As a 
matter of Treaty interpretation, the Asuncion Treaty is in a hierarchy inferior to the Montevideo 
Treaty, "vhich entails that the former has to conform the latter. Therefore, a l\IERCOSUR 
decision that ignores and confronts provisions pursuant to the Montevideo Treaty (Article 
50) violates general principles of public imernationallaw.65 
B. THE ARGENTINEAN LITIGATION 
In 2005, a new panel was constituted,66 pursuant the Olivos Protocol, to decide on 
the consistency of the Argentinean ban on retread tires "\Vith MERCOSUR law;67 In this 
dispute, the Tribunal accepted the Argentinean defense against Uruguay based on Article 50 
of the Niontevideo Treat)~ which allows for trade restriction amongst member States, provided 
the restriction is based on legitimate envit:onmeotal grounds. 68 
62 See Bressan, supm note 62. 
6
-' See Claudia Lima l'vfarques, unpublished manuscript (on file with amhor). 
64 Jd 
6> Id. 
M Vcja: http:/ /v...-ww.mercosur.in t I msweb ISM I pt I Con rrcn'ersiasiTPR/TPR_ Tribunal %20 
Ad H oc_l,audo~\~20N euma ticos_PT. pdf 
67 J'vforosini, 0 G""a.ro do.r Pn<'lt?llrifi[l).r, .rujJra note 32, at 14. 
68 Sergio Leo, Argu1tina :\-fanf!m PJYiihir(in a Pneu U.rado [Az-golfina Afaintahrr Prohihitirm again.rt U.rcd Tire], 
JOR.t"'\!AL V,'\LOR ECON01UCO, November 28, 2005, amilablr at \YWVi.valoronline.com.br (last visited 
Novc-.rnbcr 15, 2005). 
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The two contradicting 1-IERCOSUR decisions concerning apparently the very same 
issue raise .irnportant questions to the fllture development of MERCOSUR law, both in 
terms of conflicts involving trade and environment, and in relation to the dispute settlement 
mechanism. 
For the first time in -,\{ERCOSUR history, the Appellate Body\vas called on to decide 
the legal treatment conferred to trade in retread tires in the dispute bet,;veen Uruguay and 
Argentina.69 The Appellate Body, revoking the panel's report, decided that the Argentinean 
law that bans the importation of retread tires is not compatible \.Vith t.-fERCOSUR la-.v: 70 
PART III. 
THE WTO DISPUTE OVER TRADE IN RETREAD TIRES 
On January 7, 2004, the European Community (.EC) published, in the Official 
Journal of the European Union, a h'otice qf Initiatio11 of an examiJhllion proo:d!t!t: to!lteming 
obsudex to trade IJ'ithin the IJ/ti-lllil{__{!, ~l Counal &g!tlatioJI (EC) fl 0 3286 I 94, ((JI!J'ifling of trade 
pnxtireJ IIMinfained f?y Brazfl in relation to imports of refn:ated tirex [hereinafter Noticel.71 
The Norice resulted from a complaint brought by the Bmr:au Inl!:nwtiunal Ptrrl!a!lent 
des AYsociatiow· de VtndmrY et Rr:dJttjmtt:> de Pnm!Ht!liqut [Permanent International Office of 
the Tire Sellers and Retrcadets Association] (BIVAPER), an imernarional trade association 
representing the interests of manufacturers of retreated tires within the European Union. 
BIPAVT~R congregates national associations from Denmark, Finland, Italy, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden and the L'nited Kingdom. 
The Notice asserts that the Brazilian measures that give rise to the investigation 
procedure arc: 
(1) Portaria no 8 of September 25, 2000 of the Bra:.>:ilian 1Jinistry of Development, 
Industry and International Commerce, which bans the importation of retreated 
tires by prohibiting the issuance of import licences for retreated tires imported as 
consumer goods or raw material; 
(2) Presidential Decree 11° 3919 of September 14,2001, which subjects the in1portation 
as \vell as the marketing, transportation, storage, keeping or keeping in deposit 
of retreated .imported tires to a fine of R$ 400 per unit. 
09 Ve j a: http: I /www. me rcos ur. in r I ms\ve b ISM I e s /Con troversias /TPR/TP R_La udoOO 1-
2005_Imponacion°/o20de%20Neutn<lticus':·020Remoldeados.pdf. ·~;/eja tambCm: http:/ /wl.vv,:mercosur.int/ 
msweb ISi\-1/ cs/ Controversias /'fPRITPR_I ,audoOO 1--2006_Recurso0/o20de%20Aclaratoria.pdf. 
-o Id 
See Brazil impons of retreated tires notice of .initiarion http:/ /tradc-info.cec.cu.int/doclib/html/ 
115548.htm (last visi1ed May 23, 2005). 
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The Notice classifies the Brazilian measures as GATT-inconsistcnt, by discriminating 
bet\veen imported and domestic like products, in violation of Articles 1.1 (Gencrall'v1ost-
Favoured-Nation Treatment), I11.4 (National Treatment on Internal Ta.-;:ation and Regulation) 
and XI.1 (General Elimination of Quantitative Restrictions) of GATT 1994, without being 
justified under neither the exceptions of Article XX (General Exceptions), nor under .Articles 
2.1, 2.2 and 2.4 (Preparation, _Adoption and Application of Technical Regulations by Central 
Government Bodies) of the \X·TO Technical Barriers to Trade Agreement (TT3T Agreement). 
The Notice claims that the challenged Brazilian trade measures had a significant 
negative impact of Community exports of retreated tires. Prior to the introduction of the 
ban, Community exports of retreated tires amounted to approximately two million per 
year, equivalent to an estimate of25 per cent of the Brazilian market for such products . .It is 
also stressed that the Brazilian measures resulted in company closures and job losses \Vi thin 
the Community. In addition, it primarily draws attention to the negative policy implications 
of permitting least-favorable treatment of retreated tires originated from \X/TO member 
states outside 1\JERCOSUR. SecondJy, the Notice addresses the more immediate reasons, 
i.e., loss of production of retreated tires and job losses \vi thin the Community. Finally, the 
Notice considers that there is enough evidence to justify initiation of an examination procedure 
to consider the legal and factual issues involved in accordance \Vith Article 8 of the Trade 
Barriers Regulation.72 
On September 13, 2004, the European Commission Directorate··General for Trade 
published a non-confidential version of the &pori fo the Trade Banicr.r &gula!irm Committrc 
[hereinafter Report.] 73 The Report concluded the investigation had revealed clear violations 
ofWTO provisions, notably Articles XI:l, TIT:4, I:l and Xlll:l of the GA1~f 1994 that 
cannot be justified on grounds of environmental or health protection. 
Combined with severe adverse trade effects these violations have caused, the Report 
recommended that Brazil be given until October 2004 to u,i.thdraw the measures. Otherwise, 
the Commission would request \XlTO consultations in accordance "'lith the rules of the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding (DSL'). 
The Trade Barriers Regulation is a legal instrument that gives the righr ro Community enterprises and 
industries to lodge a complaint, which obliges the Commi~sion to irwestigate and evaluate ,,-hnhcr 
there is evidence of violation of international trade rules resulting in adverse trade effects. The result 
is that the procedure will lead to either a mutually agreed solution to the problem or to resort to 
dispute scukmcnt. /\rticle 8 eq:lhbhes the Cnmmnnit-y Exarnim.tion Procedure. 
Jee Report w the Trade Barriers Regulation Committee concerning an obstacle to trade, within the 
meaning uf Council Rc,gulation (EC) No. 3286/94, consisting of uade practices maintained by Brazil 
affecting rrade in reacadcd tire~ [hereinafter Report], m~11lah!r rJt http:/ /trade-info.cec.eu.int/doclib/ 
cfm/doclib_section.cfm?sec:::.:·205&lev=2& (last visited May 23, 2005). 
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On J\1ay 2, 2005, because diplomatic negotiations benveen Brazil and the European 
Communities had failed to reach a satisfactory solution, the Commission lodged a 
Commission Decision amaming the mecwtns tll:tr:JSa!)' as n:ganh an obJtade to trade mmti/lfted i:J' 
trade practices maintained f:y Bmzfl tiffixtin'--~ trade in rdreated tires [hereinafter Decision]. 74 The 
Decision concluded: 
(1) The Brazilian Government's imposition of an import ban on retreated tires and 
the related financial penalties appear to be inconsistent with Brazil's obligations 
under the J\.farrakech Agreement Establishing the \\lorld Trade Organization 
and, in particular, provisions of the CTeneral Agreement on Tariffs and Trade 
1994, and constitutes an obstacle to trade within the meaning of Article 2(1) of 
Regulation (EC) no 3286/94;'5 
(2) The Community will initiate dispute settlement proceedings against Bra:t:il under 
the Understanding on Rules and Procedures Governing the Settlement of 
Disputes and other relevant \X7TO pruv1sions to secure removal of the obstacles 
to trade. 
In January 2006, at the request of the EC, the \X'TO established a panel, under the 
Dispute Settlement Understanding, to analyze whether the Brazilian import ban on retread 
tires is GATT-consistent.76 To date, Brazil has not yet issued any formal response to the 
claims brought by the EC, concerning the alleged inconsistency of the Brazilian measures 
with GATT 1994. 
In case the EC decides to challenge the consistency of the Brazilian measures with the 
GATT 1994, it is likely that Brazil will justify the irnport ban under the General Exceptions 
of Article XX of Gi\TT, letters (b) and (g). Article XX GATT provides that, if "a !JJI'a.flfre is 
not applied i11 a JJ/tl!llltr zvhich JPottfd ronstitltte a J!leuns ~~ arbitrat)' or myltJ!ijiable diJaimiwlfion 
betwee11 counl!ie.f whnt the same mnditiom prnkli£ or a di-t~uixed reJtriction on iutenwlional trade" 
(Chapeau of Article XX), a country may adopt measures that \vould othenvisc constitute a 
trade restriction if not for its legitimate goal of: (b) protection of human, animal or plant life 
or health, and (g) conservation of exhaustible natural resources. 
-
4 At·ail<~bk at http:/ /trade-info.cec.eu.int/ doclib/ cfm/ doclib_section.cfm?sec=205&lev=2& (lasf visited 
l\tfay 23, 2005). 
75 Under Article 2(1), "obstacles to trade shall be any trade practice adopted or mainLlined by a third 
country in respect of '>Vhich international trade rules establhh a right of action. Such a right of action 
exists when international trade rules either prohibit a practice outright, or give another party affected 
by the practke a right to seek diminatiun of the effect of the practice in question." 
76 \\'T /DS322/1, .;rai!ab!c at hup:/ /WW\\'.\\"to.org/ english/tratop_e/ dispu_e/ cases __ e/ ds332_e.htm (last 
visited March 31, 2006). 
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If Braz_il decides to invoke the General Exceptions of Article X.L'{ to justify the 
import ban on retread tires, it'\vill have to prove that the import ban falls within the range of 
policies designed to protect human life or health and that the inconsistent measures for 
which the exception is invoked are necessary to fulfill the policy objective. 77 
There seems to he enough evidence that the measures adopted by Brazil, restricting 
imports of retread tires may give rise to a defense based on environmental grounds. First, it 
is clear that the unrestricted importation of retread tires, and its storage, by itself, poses 
serious environmental risks. Second, the water from the rain accumulated in the interior of 
theses tires is a perfect habitat for the procreation of mosquitoes imposes serious public 
health concerns. Third, the bmning of these tires, when they become no longer usable, 
discharges toxic substances harmful both to the environment and to public health. On top 
of that, concerning the lack of scientific certainty as to the actual environmental risks of 
unrestricted imports of retread tires, Brazil could arguably develop a defense based on the 
precautionary principle. 78 
In this sense, if there exists no least restrictive ways to address the health risks 
imposed by the unrestricted importation of retread tires, it seems sensible to invoke the 
General Exceptions of A.rticle XX GATT79 
It would follo\V that the risks to public health orit:,rinated from storing tires \Vith 
raimvater in their interior, risking, at a further level, the development of dengue and yellmv 
fever epidemic, would justify the invocation of Article XX (b), that provides for the adoption 
of measures that are necessary to protect human, animal or plant life or health. Second, the 
See Panel Report, United States- Gm!lint, pam. 6.20; Pand Report, l'c"C -· Asbesto.r, para. 8.169; see also 
Appellate Body Report, .bC- Arbntf!s, paras. 157~163. 
''B BHt see EC Hormones: "The status of lhe precautionary principle in international law continues to 
be the subject of debate among academics, law practitioners, reg11lators and judges. The precautionary 
principle is .regarded by some as hewing crystal!i?cd into a general principle of customary international 
environmental hw. \Vhether it has been \videly accepted by Members a,: a principle of genetal or 
customaty international law appears less than dear. \'V'e consider, however, that ir is unneces,ary, and 
ptobably imprudent, for the Appellate Body in this appeal to take a position on this important, but 
abstract, c1uestion. W'e note that the Panel itself did oot make any definitive finding \vith regard to 
the status of the precautiona"Ly principle in international la\v and that the precautionary principle, at 
least ourside the field of international environmental law, still a\\-a.its authoritative formulation." Para. 
123, \VI/DS26/AB/R, WT/DS48/AB/R. 
'
9 Cf. ]f]jhm - Agrimltum! PmdJf(f.r ll: '1\tticle 5.6 of the SPS Agreement prohibits SPS mcasm-es rhat arc 
more trade~restrictive than required to achieve a J\-lcmber's appropriate level of protection. According 
to rhc footnote to Article 5.6, a measure is considered more trade-restrictive than required if there 
is another SPS measure \vhich: 
(1) is reasonably available raking into account technical and economic feasibility; 
(2) achie•/es the .i'viember's appropriate level of sanitary or phytosanitary protection; and 
(3) is significantly less restricr.ive to trade than the SPS measure contested, 
As \Ve have stated in our Report in /1N.rltalifl ralmnn, these three clements are cumulative in narure." 
Para. 95, \\lT/DS76/AB/R. 
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toxic substances liberated from the burning of these tires could be addressed, \.Vhich endangers 
the environmental and public health, could fall under letter (b) (toxic substances are harmful 
to human, animal and plant life and health) and letter (g), for measmes relating to the 
conservation of exhaustible natural resources (the air, earth and -,vatcr could arguably qualify 
as exhaustible natural resources). 
_However, letter (g) of Article XX also states that in order for a measure to fall under 
the General Exceptions, it has to be "made effective in conjunction \vith restrictions on 
domestic production or consumption". Concerning the application of similar measures to 
the domestic retread tires industry; it bears mentioning that under Resolution n° 258 of the 
National Co1.1ncil of the Environment (COl'\AT\lA), presided by the J\'linistry of the 
Environment, of August 26, 1999, in force since 2002, domestic producer:::; of new tires and 
importers of tires are obliged to give an adequate enYironmental destination to such tires. 
On 0.'1arch 21,2003, CONAJ\:fA issued Resolution no 301, ·which amends Resolution ll0 258, 
to extend the obligation to give environmentaLty adequate destination to imported retread 
tires. 
But, if, on the one hand, Brazil implemented regulation to monitor the environmental 
impact of the activity of producers of new tires and importers of new and retread tires, on 
the other, it is disputable the treatment conferred to domestic tire retre-J.ding industry. Maybe 
the lobby from tire retreaders that operate in Brazil was strong enough to leave these companies 
outside the scope of application ofCONA:-.JA Resolutions Nos. 258 and 301. J"vforcover, 
according to the EC, the enforcement of CONAT\lA Resolutions in Brazil has been 
problcmatic. 81) 
Lastly, if Brazil is able to convince the panel that the import ban falls under the 
general exceptions of Article XX, letters (b) or (g)- or both, Brazil still needs to pass rhc 
scrutiny of the thupet~!l of Article XX, i.e., that the "ll!etlSI!re iJ nul appliul in a Jlh!Jl111:r JrhidJ IJ'OH!d 
twHiillflt a I!Jtam qf arbi!tW)' r;r 111(;/tJ!!flL~bk dixtri!)Jiflalio!l /JeiWft!! tolf!zfrieJ u!Jen: tht Sdlllt tonditions 
pn:vai!, or a di.sgJtiJal restridion on intem~.lfional trade."81 
8° Cf. R,fur;!!J<l,t!u! Cii.idinc Case, \vhcrc the Panel held that [he Gasoline Regulations "vere inconsisrent 
\Vith Article 111:4 GATT, which require~ that imported like products must be treated no less favorably 
than like domes[ic products with respect to la\vs and reguhtiUB~. 
81 In October 1998, the \X-TO Appellate Body decided thar a U.S. ban on shrimp harvested by ffi("thods 
that are harmful to sea turtles was "unjusrifi.able"' and "arbiLrary." even though rhe Unilcd States 
prohibited rhe use of these methods by its O\vn tuna fleet, and even though the sea turtles species 
protected by the ban were recognized to be in danger of extinnion. 
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IV. CoNCLUSION 
The outcome of the tire case in the W'TO is unpredictable. On the one hand, the 
rejection of the environmental exceptions \Yould not come as a surprise in the light of past 
GATT/WlTO trade and em-ironment jurisprudence. On the other hand, \\TO\ recognition 
of the legitimacy of the environmental exception in the present case \Yonld yield important 
policy implications for the international community and l'vfERCOSUR especially. 
First, \\?TO would create a precedent in fa:vor of environmental protection to the 
detriment of free trade. Second, a~ for :\JF.RCOSl"R specifically, a \YTO decision recognizing 
the supremacy of the environmental protection over purely commercial interests could 
certainly have a direct impact on the \JERCOSLTR lJtigation. Bur most importantly, if Bmzil 
succeeds in its environmental defense, it ·will be signaling to !"he international community 
that the protection of t·hc env-ironment is not an exclusive concern of de\Tlopcd countries. 
BIBLIOGRAPHY: 
Jagdish Bhagwati, The Demand to Reduce Domestic Diversity among Trading 
Nations, in ]l\GDISH BHAGWATJ & ROBERT E. HUDEC (eds.), Fii.IR TRADE AND 
HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TR:\DE?, V1 (1996); 
Jagdish Bha~vati & T. N. SriniYan, Trade and the Em'irrm!lJnd: Does Enrirrmmental 
Dil'eni(y Detmct from the Case for Free Tlm!c?, in JAGDTSH BI-L\G\XlATJ & ROBERT E. 
HUDEC (eds.), FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUJSTTES FOR 
FREE TRADE?, V1 (1996); 
EDITH BROWN WEISS & JOHN H. JACKSON (eds.), RECONCILING 
ENVIRONMENT AND TRADE (2001); 
Alcssandra Casella_, !-"Tee Trade and l:~rolri!Zf!, Strmdard.r, in JAGDISH BHAG\X'ATI & 
ROBERT E. HUDEC (eds.). FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: 
PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?, V1 (1996); 
Carolyn L. Deere & Daniel C. Esty, Trade and thl' EnrimnnHnt in tbe Amnira.f: Orerriew 
if Key lsJues, in GREENING THE AMERICAS: NAFTA'S LESSONS FOR 
HEMISPHERIC TRADE (Carolyn L. Deere & Daniel C. Esty eds.) (2002); 
D,~NJELC.ESTY,GREE:\:I:\:GTI-!EGA1TTRADE,ENVIRO~MENT,AND 
THE FUTURE (1994); 
Patricia Isela Hansen, 'franspr7rmo:, StandrtrdJ qf Enim; and the U.!e rf Trade /'1-'fett.mrn to 
Profert the Global Enl'ironmml, 39 'lA.]. lNT'L L 107 (1999); 
JOHN H. JACKSON, W1I.LIAMJ. DAVEY &ALLAN 0. SYKES, JR .• LEGi\L 
PROBLEMS OF INTEfu'-iATIONJ\I. ECONOMIC RElATIONS (4"' ed., 2002); 
98 
JOHN H. JACKSON, WILLIAM J DAVEY & ALLAN 0. SYKES, JR., 
DOCUMENTS SUPPLEMENT TO LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMIC RELATIONS (4"' cd., 2002); 
Alvin K. Klcvorick, Rifledions on the Race to the Bottom, in JAGDISH BH.AG\Xh\TI 
& ROBERT E. HUDEC (cds.), FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: 
PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE', VI (1996); 
David \X~: Leebron, L::Yil:!,g DmP!t with PruattJ!es: AnAna/Jsi.r of Ffaf'IJJ()fll~alion Cli!itJIJ', in 
JAGDISH BHAGWATI & ROBERT E. HUDEC (eds.), FAIR TRADE AND 
HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?, Vl (1996); 
Arik Levinson, Enrirofli/Ji.!fllilfRegulatiom and Indmto· Lth11fion: International and Domestic 
Eridcntt, in JAGDIS!-l Bl-IAGW:\Tl & ROBERT E. HUDEC (eds.), FAIR TRADE AND 
HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?, VI (1996); 
Fabio 1\Jorosini, Rtpensando Estmtigius de Reg!fia{clo -'4mbiental Ltf'Oes a partir da 
Evperibuia da Uniiio Eurr;piia e do _N/lFl/1, 38 Revista de Dlreito Ambiental (Sao Paulo, RT 
ed.) 2005 [Republicado em 40 Revista de Direito Am bien tal (Sao Paulo, RT ed.) 2005]. 
_______ , 0 Caso dos Pne!iJJJtilitOJ": Pnftdntias Regioum:r e Quex!Ues Ambien/aZ:r, 
POJ\!TE5~ Outubro ~" Dezembro 2005. 
______ , El caso de los neum{lticos en la OMC: Preferencias regionales y 
cuestiones ambientales, PUENTES, Encro- Febrero 2006. 
Eric Neumayer, Trade jfnmm.'s in :\fn!ti!titeral Enrirunmellfal Agreemwls cmd the If~() 
Rules: Po !entia! )Or Conflid) Scope for Retomiliation, A!tJseml'ir!Jtbcft 55, no. 3 (2000), pp. 403-
426; 
Richard Parker, The Ure and Abuse r:jTrade Len:ragt to Proted the Global Commom: What 
TPe Can I _earn from the T11na-Dolpbin Conf/id, 12 GEO. INT'J, L. REV 1 (1999); 
Joe R. Paul, Free 'Trade, Regulato~y Competilion and !he Atllonol!tous LHttrke/ Ht!lacy', 1 
COLUM. J EUR L 29 (1995); 
Ellen R. Shaffer, Howard \"X-'aitzkin et al., Globai'Trade and Public _Healtb, A0.-lERICAN 
JOURl"lAL OF PUBLIC 1-JEALTH,JANUARY 2005, Vol95, rt I; 
Gregory C. Shaffer, The lf/orfd Trade Organiz~.dion IInder Challenge: Det~JOITtti)' and the 
Law and Politic:r if the IJVTOS TreutJ!Iwt o/ Trade and Enrirotttue!!l JJatten, 25 Han~ Envtl. L. 
Rev. I (2001); 
John Douglas \Vi1son, Capita/,\fobi!i!J' and Enrironmenta!Jtd!Uiards: Is There a Theoretical 
Basisfor a Race to th, Botto111?, in JAGDISH BHAGWJ\Tl & ROBERT E. HUDEC (eels.), 
FAIR TRADE AND HARMONIZATION: PREREQUISITES FOR FREE TRADE?, 
V1 (1996); 
Symposia: Judicialization and Globalization of the Judiciary,'fT•X !NT'LLJ 2003/2lXJ4; 
Symposium: The Boundaries of \10'TO Law; J\;.'vL J INT'L L., VoL 96, n° 1 ,Jan., 2002. 
